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Abstract
We consider a version of large population games whose players compete
for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. The system
efficiency is measured by the variance of the decisions. In the regime
where the system can be plagued by the maladaptive behavior of the
players, we find that diversity among the players improves the system
efficiency, though it slows the convergence to the steady state. Diversity
causes a mild spread of resources at the transient state, but reduces the
uneven distribution of resources in the steady state.
1 Introduction
In recent years, there is an increasing interest in studying the adaptive behavior of players
when they learn to play games together [1]. Much work focused on learning algorithms
computing Nash equilibria for players connected by graphs [2], or mutually interacting
through global functions [3]. Since these processes are dynamical in nature, it would be
interesting to consider how the transient and steady states of the system depend on the
choice of initial conditions. When it reaches the steady state, it is possible that the system
evolves periodically or even chaotically, or gets trapped in suboptimal attractors. It is
therefore important to study the collective dynamical behavior of multi-agent systems.
In this paper, we consider the dynamics of a version of large population games which
models the collective behavior of players simultaneously and adaptively competing for
limited resources. The game is a variant of the Minority Game (MG), in which the players
making the minority decision are the winners [4]. It may be applied to various adaptive
systems, such as predators searching for hunting grounds with fewer competitors, network
routers trying to find the path with least delay, or traders in a financial market trying to buy
stocks at a low price when most other traders are trying to sell (or vice versa).
We are interested in whether the entire system performs efficiently. For example, if the
MG corresponds to the distribution of resources among a network of load balancers, then
the system is said to be efficient if the load is uniformly distributed among the players.
Similarly, if the MG corresponds to trading agents in a stock market, then the system is
said to be efficient if the fractions of winners and losers are the same.
Previous work [5] showed that when the complexity of the players’ strategies is too high,
the players cannot collectively explore the strategy space thoroughly, thus limiting the mar-
ket efficiency. On the other hand, when the complexity of the players’ strategies is too low,
the market efficiency suffers from the maladaptive behavior of the players, meaning that
they prematurely rush to adapt to market changes in bursts. Maladpatation is a common
but undesirable phenomenon in many adaptive systems. As will be shown in this paper, the
introduction of diversity to the preference of strategies of the players can lead to a better
system efficiency.
2 The Minority Game
The Minority Game (MG) involves a population of players repeatedly competing to be in
the minority group in an environment of limited resources [4]. Each of the N players can
make a decision 1 or 0 at each time step, N being odd. The decisions may represent buy (1)
or sell (0) if the MG models a market, or the choice of one of two tasks if the MG models
a group of load balancers. Each agent makes her decision independently according to her
own finite set of “strategies” which will be defined later. After all players have made their
choices, players who have made decision 1 are declared winners if there are fewer 1’s than
0’s, and we denote the outcome by 1; otherwise, players who have made decision 0 win
and the outcome is 0. The wealth acquired by an individual player is measured by her real
points, which increases (decreases) by 1 if she wins (loses) at a time step. The time series
of 1’s and 0’s is called “history”, and is made available to all players as the only global
information for their next choices.
At each time step, the players make their decisions based on the most recent m bits in
the history, hence m is known as the memory size. There are D ≡ 2m possible histories,
thus D is the dimension of the strategy space. A strategy is then a function which maps
each of the D histories to decisions 1 or 0. Before the game starts, each agent randomly
picks s strategies from the pool of strategies, with repetitions allowed. Each agent holds
her strategy set throughout the whole game. At each time step, the players choose, out of
the s strategies she has, the one which has so far adapted most successfully to the game,
and make decisions accordingly.
The success of a strategy is measured by its virtual point, which increases (decreases)
by 1 if it indicates the winning (losing) decision at a time step, irrespective of whether
it is chosen at that time step by an agent or not. The availability of multiple strategies
provides an agent with adaptivity, such that she may use an alternative strategy when the
one she chooses does not work well. Though we only consider random strategies instead
of organized ones, we expect that the model is sufficient to capture the main features of the
macroscopic collective behavior of many players with diverse strategies.
To model diversity among the players, the players may enter the game with diverse pref-
erences of their strategies. This is done by randomly assigning R virtual points to the s
strategies of each agent before the game starts, R being an odd integer. Hence the initial
virtual point of each strategy obeys a multinomial distribution with mean R/s and variance
R(s− 1)/s2. R can thus be considered as a parameter of randomness. The ratio ρ ≡ R/N
is referred to as the diversity. Furthermore, the game is deterministic for odd R and s = 2,
since in this case no two strategies have the same virtual points throughout the game.
This is in contrast with previous versions of the game, in which the virtual points of all
strategies are initialized to zero, corresponding to the special case of R = 0. The ho-
mogeneous initial condition leads to the further simplification that the virtual points of a
strategy appears the same to all players subsequently. However, this assumption needs to be
re-examined for two reasons. First, if the MG is used as a model of distributed load balanc-
ing, it becomes natural to investigate whether the artificially created maladaptive behavior
has prevented an efficient exploration of the phase space, thus hindering the attainment of
optimal system efficiency. Second, if the MG is used as a model of financial markets, it is
not natural to expect that all agents have the same preference of a strategy at all instants of
the game.
3 Main Features of the MG
Let N1(t) be the population of players making decision 1 at the t-th time step. To study
whether the game distributes resources efficiently, we first consider the case of small R. As
shown in Fig. 1(a), the variance σ2/N of the population for decision 1 scales as a function
of the complexity α ≡ D/N , agreeing with previous observations [5]. When α is small,
games with increasing complexity create time series of decreasing fluctuations. However,
the variance does not decrease with α monotonically. Instead, there is a minimum around
αc ≃ 0.5, after which it increases gradually to a so-called coin-toss limit, as if they were
making their decisions randomly, with σ2/N = 0.25.
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Figure 1: (a) The dependence of the variance on the complexity at s = 2 and averaged over 128
samples for each data point. (b) The dependence of the variance on the diversity at s = 2 and
averaged over 1024 samples. Solid line: theoretical results form not too large, with the three leftmost
data points replaced by results for m = 1 and small R.
The existence of a minimum variance lower than the coin-toss limit shows that the players
are able to cooperate to improve the system efficiency, despite the fact that the players are
selfish and making independent decisions. Savit et al [5] identified that as the complexity
changes across a critical value, the system undergoes a phase transition. In the high com-
plexity phase, the players cannot coordinate to explore the strategy space effectively. This
is because the coordination of the players’ strategies depends on the availability of informa-
tion of the population’s responses to D different strings. When N ≪ D, the number sN of
strategies possessed by the population is much less than the numberD of input states of the
strategies. This makes the coordination of players difficult, limiting the market efficiency.
On the other hand, the dynamics is highly periodic in the low complexity phase [5]. This
periodicity is caused by the existence of some players who, on losing the game, switch their
strategies in an attempt to win at the next occurence of the same game history. However,
their switch turns out to tip the balance of the strategy distribution, and the previously
winning bit (which used to be the minority bit) becomes at the next occurence a losing
bit (which newly becomes the majority bit). This switching can go on back and forth
indefinitely, resulting in the periodic dynamics. In other words, the game is undesirably
influenced by players who are maladaptive to the environment. This causes the very large
variances of the decisions, which becomes larger than that of random decisions in most of
the low complexity phase.
Hence we show, on the same figure, the variance for different values of diversity ρ. It
is observed that the variance decreases significantly with diversity in the low complexity
phase, although it remains unaffected in the high complexity phase. Furthermore, for a
game efficiency prescribed by a given value of variance σ2/N , the required complexity of
the players is much reduced.
Figure 1(a) also illustrates the scaling of the variance with respect to complexity and diver-
sity. When both m and N vary, we find that the data points collpase together for the same
values of ρ and α. This means that randomness affects the system behavior in multiples of
N .
The scaling of the variance with diversity is further confirmed in Figure 1(b) for given
memory sizes m. Furthermore, except for the several points with very small R (R =
1, 3, 7), the variance scales as ρ−1 over a wide range of diversity.
To illustrate the physical picture, we consider the fraction of players switching strategies at
low values of m. In this case, there are relatively few pairs of possible strategies. Hence
when R is not too small, the virtual point distribution for a strategy pair can be described
by a Gaussian distribution with standard deviation scaling as
√
R. At each time step, the
fraction of players switching strategies is determined by those whose strategies have equal
virtual points. Hence this fraction scales as 1/
√
R, leading to a variance of σ2/N ∼ ρ−1.
(The scaling relation deviates at smallR because the multinomial nature of the virtual point
distribution deviates from the Gaussian profile at larger R.) Qualitatively, with random ini-
tial conditions, there is now a diversity of players having different preferences of strategies.
At each time step, only those with weak preferences switch strategies. This greatly reduces
the maladaptive behavior and the population variance.
This physical picture is further illustrated by considering the fraction of players who
switches their strategies even after the game has reached the steady state. These dynamic
players hold strategy pairs whose virtual point differences are distributed near zero, and
hence should scale as 1/
√
R. This is confirmed in Fig. 2(a).
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Figure 2: The dependence of (a) the fraction of dynamic players on the randomness, and (b) the
convergence time on the diversity, at s = 2 and averaged over 1024 samples for each data point.
On the other hand, since diversity reduces the fraction of players switching strategies at
each time step, it also slows down the convergence to the steady state. It has been argued
that the dynamics of the game proceeds in a direction which reduces the variance [6]. Since
the step size scales as 1/
√
R, and the fractional difference of the population with decisions
1’s and 0’s has an initial variance scaling as 1/
√
N , the convergence time scales as ρ1/2.
As shown in Fig. 2(b), the dynamics converges almost instantly to the steady state for small
R. Beyond that, the predicted scaling relation holds for various values of N over a wide
range of diversity.
It is instructive to consider how the distribution of wealth or resources acquired by the
players changes with diversity, both at the transient and steady states. We find that all
frozen players (that is, players who do not switch their strategies at the steady state) have
constant average wealth at the steady state. Hence any differences in their wealth are a
consequence of the transient dynamics. The variance of the wealth distribution should
scale as the square of the convergence time, that is, as ρ. As shown in Fig. 3(a), this scaling
relation indeed holds beyond the region of small R where the dynamics converges almost
instantly to the steady state. It is interesting to note the similarities between Figs. 3(a) and
2(b), demonstrating that they have the same origin.
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Figure 3: (a) The dependence of the variance of wealth among the frozen players; (b) the individual
wealth accquired per step of all players (in descending order) for three games with different values of
ρ at m = 4, s = 2 and N = 1023, averaged over 1024 samples.
Figure 3(b) shows the individual wealth acquired per step by the players at the steady state,
ranked from left to right in descending order for games with various diversity. For R =
0, the game is relatively inefficient, since even the most successful players cannot break
even in their wealth acquisition. When diversity increases, there is an increasing fraction
of players with maximum individual wealth. It is interesting to note that the individual
wealth of the players has a maximum of 0 per step in all cases with nonvanishing diversity,
indicating the tendency of the game to distribute resource evenly. The collective wealth
acquired by the game, or the overall resource utilization, is measured by the area under the
curve of individual wealth, which again increases with diversity.
4 Dynamics of the MG
We have formulated a theory for the dynamics of the MG at small memory sizes m. Con-
sider the history of the game denoted by the series σ(t) = 0, 1. We describe the state of the
game at time t by an integer µ(t) of modulo D, where
µ(t) =
m−1∑
t′=0
σ(t− t′)2t′ . (1)
Let ξµα be the decision of strategy α at state µ. In the following analysis, we will write
ξµα = ±1 for decisions 1 and 0 respectively. The strategies α are labelled from 1 to 2D. The
D-dimensional phase space of the game is described by the collective decision components
Aµ(t) =
1
N
∑
α
nα(t)ξ
µ
α, (2)
where nα(t) denotes the number of players using strategy α at time t. Note that one of
these states corresponds to the historical state of the game, and is denoted by µ∗(t).
Below, we compute nα(t) for s = 2; generalization to other values of s is straightforward.
Let Sαβ(ω) be the number of players holding strategies α and β (with α < β), and the
virtual point of strategy α is initially displaced by ω with respect to β. The average of
Sαβ(ω) is given by
〈Sαβ(ω)〉 = N
22D−1
(
R
(R − ω)/2
)
1
2R
. (3)
This equation is valid for general values of R. In particular, when R is not too small,
the binomial distribution in Eq. (3) approaches a Gaussian distribution with variance R,
rendering the analysis even more transparent.
The key to analysing the game dynamics with random initial conditions is the observation
that the virtual points of all strategies displace by exactly the same amount when the game
proceeds, though their initial values may be different. Hence for a given strategy pair,
the profile of the virtual point distribution remains binomial, but the peak position shifts
with the game dynamics. If the virtual point displacement of strategy α is Ωα(t) at time
t, then the players holding strategies α and β make decisions according to strategy α if
ω +Ωα(t)− Ωβ(t) > 0, and strategy β otherwise.
Let us consider the change in Aµ(t) when state µ is the historical state. Since the winning
state is−sgnAµ(t), the virtual points of strategyα shift fromΩα(t) to Ωα(t)−sgnAµ(t)ξµα.
Changes in the collective decision are only contributed by players with virtual points on the
verge of switching signs, that is, ω + Ωα(t) − Ωβ(t) = ±1, and ξµα − ξµβ = ∓2sgnAµ(t).
Hence we have
Aµ(t+ 1)−Aµ(t) = −sgnAµ(t) 2
N
∑
α<β
[
Sαβ(−1− Ωα(t) + Ωβ(t))
δ(ξµα − ξµβ ,−2sgnAµ(t)) + Sαβ(1− Ωα(t) + Ωβ(t))δ(ξµα − ξµβ , 2sgnAµ(t))
]
,(4)
where δ(m,n) denotes the Kronecka delta. In the region where D ≪ lnN , we have
Sαβ(ω)≫ 1, and the decision component in Eq. (4) is self-averaging. Writing
δ(ξµα − ξµβ ,±2) =
1
4
(1− ξµαξµβ ± ξµα ∓ ξµβ ), (5)
and observing that the magnitude of virtual point displacements are typically much less
than the width
√
R of the virtual point distribution, so that 〈sαβ(ω)〉 can be approximated
by its value at ω = 0, we arrive at
Aµ(t+ 1)−Aµ(t) = −sgnAµ(t) 1
22D
∑
αβ
√
2
piR
(1− ξµαξµβ ). (6)
Since
∑
α ξ
µ
α = 0, the final result is
Aµ(t+ 1)−Aµ(t) = −sgnAµ(t)
√
2
piR
, µ = µ∗(t). (7)
Similarly, one can verify that if ν is not the historical state at time t, then
Aν(t+ 1)−Aν(t) = 0, ν 6= µ∗(t). (8)
Now we can consider the steady state dynamics, which has a period of 2D. This is consis-
tent with the picture that the dynamics proceeds in the direction which reduces the variance
of the decisions, as evident in Eq. (7). Concretely, the state evolution is given by the integer
equation
µ∗(t+ 1) = mod (2µ∗(t) + σ(t), D), (9)
so that every state µ appears as historical states two times in a steady-state period, with σ(t)
appearing as 0 and 1, each exactly once. One occurence brings the decision component
Aµ from positive to negative, and another bringing it back from negative to positive, thus
completing a cycle. Due to the maladaptive nature of the dynamics, the component keeps
on oscillating, but never reaches the zero value. For examples, the steady state for m = 1
is given by the sequence µ(t) = σ(t) = 0, 1, 1, 0, where one notes that both states 0 and
1 are followed by 0 and 1 once each. For m = 2, there are 2 attractors, described by the
sequences µ(t) = 0, 1, 3, 3, 2, 1, 2, 0 and µ(t) = 0, 1, 2, 1, 3, 3, 2, 0. Again, one notes that
each of the states 0, 1, 2, 3 are followed by an even (σ(t) = 0) and an odd state (σ(t) = 1)
once each.
As a result, each state is eventually confined in aD-dimensional hypercube of size
√
2/piR,
irrespective of the initial position of the decision components. This confinement enables
us to compute the variance of the decisions. Without loss of generality, let us relabel the
time steps in the periodic attractor, with t = 0 corresponding to the state with µ∗(t) = 0
and µ∗(t + 1) being odd, and let us denote as tµ the step at which state µ first appears
in the relabeled sequence. (For example, for the first m = 2 attractor mentioned above,
t0 = 0, t1 = 1, t2 = 4 and t3 = 2.) When state µ first appears in the attractor on or after
t = 0, its decision component is Aµ(t = 0) by virtue of Eq. (8), and the winning state is
2σ(tµ)− 1. When state µ appears in the attractor the second time, its decision component
is Aµ(t = 0) + [2σ(tµ) − 1]
√
2/piR from Eq. (7), and the winning state is 1 − 2σ(tµ).
Since the winning state is determined by the minority decision, these impose the conditions
−
√
2
piR
< Aµ(t = 0)[2σ(tµ)− 1] < 0. (10)
Suppose the game starts from the initial state Aµ0 , which are Gaussian numbers with mean
0 and variance 1/N . They change in steps of size
√
2/piR until they reaches the attractor,
whose 2D historical states are then given by√
2
piR
⌈√
piR
2
Aµ0
⌉
and
√
2
piR
{⌈√
piR
2
Aµ0
⌉
− 1
}
, (11)
where ⌈x⌉ represents the decimal part of x. This corresponds to a variance of decisions
given by
σ2
N
≡ N
4
〈[Aµ∗(t)(t)− 〈Aµ∗(t)(t)〉]2〉 = 1
2piρ
f(ρ), (12)
where f(ρ) is a smooth function of ρ, which approaches (1 − 1/4D)/3 for ρ ≫ 1. Note
that Eq. (12) holds for general values of m, provided that they are not too large. This is
verified in Fig. 1(b) where the simulation results for m = 1 and m = 2 collapse, and
agree with the theory. Results for higher values of m, to be presented elsewhere, also
yield excellent agreement with simulations. For small values of R, the 2D historical states
can be computed similarly, taking into account the multinomial nature of the virtual point
distribution, and yield excellent agreement with simulation results.
Other parameters, such as the convergence time, the fraction of dynamic players, and the
wealth distribution, can be computed from the same physical picture of the game dynamics.
Detailed derivations will be presented elsewhere.
5 Conclusion
We have studied the effects of diversity in the initial preference of strategies on a version
of large population games. We find that it leads to an increase in the system efficiency,
and a reduction of the required complexity for a given efficiency. Both theoretical and
simulational studies show that scaling relations exist for the dependence of the efficiency
on the diversity. The variance of decisions in the low complexity phase decreases, showing
that the maladaptive behavior is reduced. Likewise, the resource at the steady state is also
more evenly distributed. On the other hand, the convergence time increases with diversity.
Theoretical studies confirm the physical picture that the game proceeds in steps which tend
to reduce the difference between the population of the two decisions, projected along one
state at each step. Maladaptation prevents the difference from reducing to zero, overshoot-
ing at each step by a step size scaling as 1/
√
R, resulting in the periodic attractor at the low
complexity phase. This provides an explanation for the scaling behavior of the variance of
decisions and other parameters as a function of the diversity.
The sensitivity of the steady state to the initial conditions has implications to adaptation and
learning in games. When distributive learning algorithms of the reinforcement-learning
type are devised, it may be possible that a Nash equilibrium cannot be reached. In the
present example of MG, we find that the dynamic players lose wealth continuously at the
steady state, because of their untimely switching between two strategies. In other words,
the dynamical rules of virtual point updates prevent them from adopting the best response
in a timely fashion.
Hence care should be taken to avoid maladaptation. If maladaptation is indeed a problem,
it will be useful to limit its effects by introducing diversity among the players, so that the
phase space is more efficiently explored. Like the present experiment, diversity may help
us to attain an increased system efficiency with less complex players.
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